An incentive scheme for non-cooperative social networks under the Independent Cascade Model by Xu, K et al.
Title An incentive scheme for non-cooperative social networks underthe Independent Cascade Model
Author(s) Yang, Y; Li, VOK; Xu, K
Citation
The 2013 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web
Intelligence (WI) and Intelligent Agent Technologies (IAT),
Atlanta, GA., 18-20 November 2013. In Conference Proceedings,
2013, p. 565-570
Issued Date 2013
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/191602
Rights IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Web Intelligence(WI). Copyright © IEEE Computer Society.
An Incentive Scheme for Non-Cooperative Social
Networks under the Independent Cascade Model
Yile Yang, Victor O.K. Li, Kuang Xu
University of Hong Kong
Pokfulam, Hong Kong, China
{ylyang, vli, xukuang}@eee.hku.hk
Abstract—In this paper we analyze influence maximization for
noncooperative social networks under the Independent Cascade
Model. We propose a model of noncooperative nodes and prove
some interesting properties of this model. Based on this, we
further develop a game-theoretic model to characterize the
behavior of noncooperative nodes, and design a Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves-like scheme to incentivise cooperation. An advertiser can
resolve the negative effect of noncooperation with our proposed
solution. Evaluation on large social networks demonstrates the
importance of cooperation and the effectiveness of our proposed
incentive scheme in maximizing influence. We also discuss the
budget allocation between seed nodes activation and incentives
to non-seed nodes.
Keywords—influence maximization; cooperative; social net-
work
I. INTRODUCTION
Identifying pilot users is critical for social-network adver-
tisers to spread product adoption influence in the potential
customer base, and thus to maximize client revenues. The
famous influence maximization problem [1] is to select “op-
timal” initial seed nodes. Nevertheless, non-pilot/intermediate
user may also influence the spreading of product adoption.
Generally, pilot users are more likely to help forward the
product information to their social neighbors because they feel
“special” as early adopters and have a sense of duty for ac-
cepting certain incentives (e.g., free sample or discount) from
advertisers [2]. However, other users may not be willing to
pass on the influence (or are noncooperative) since the action
incurs cost (e.g., time, credibility, privacy, etc.). Therefore, we
believe it is important to investigate influence maximization in
noncooperative social networks.
In this paper, we study the influence maximization problem
in a social network in which nodes are noncooperative in
propagating the influence. Firstly we generalize the standard
Independent Cascade Model (ICM) to take node noncooper-
ation into consideration, and prove some nice properties of
the corresponding model. Then we design a Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves-like (VCG-like) incentive mechanism to stimulate user
cooperation. We use data from a large academic collaboration
network to evaluate our strategy. Results validate the impor-
tance of cooperation and the effectiveness of our proposed
incentive scheme in maximizing influence. We also discuss the
budget allocation between seed nodes activation and providing
incentives to non-seed nodes.
We proceed as follows. Section II describes related work,
Section III, model and property, Section IV, incentive scheme,
Section V, evaluation, and Section VI, conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
Prior work on solving influence maximization problem
focuses on formulating influence propagation models [3] and
related algorithmic optimization problems [4]. [1] show the
NP-hardness of the corresponding optimization problem and
provide a greedy seed node selection heuristic that can achieve
near-optimal performance. [5] applies game theory to study the
phenomena of innovation spreading. However, these work do
not account for the heterogeneity of cooperativeness between
the seed and ordinary nodes during the influence propagation
process. In the field of computer communications, the prob-
lem of noncooperative routing and load balancing have been
studied (see, e.g. [6] and [7], respectively) as examples of the
impact of noncooperation on networked systems. In this paper
we address the noncooperation problem in the online social
advertising scenario. A natural approach to overcome node
noncooperation is to provide incentives. Designing incentive
mechanism has long been a hot topic in networking research.
For example, [8] studies incentive issues in participatory sens-
ing applications and design a Reverse Auction based Dynamic
Price (RADP) mechanism to stimulate user participation. The
VCG auction scheme has also been applied to design incentive
schemes. [9] implements a variation of the VCG scheme in a
mobile ad hoc network consisting of selfish nodes so that all
nodes will report the true information.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We first formulate the influence maximization problem
and introduce the noncooperative ICM. Following our prior
work [10] which proved the submodularity of the noncoopera-
tive Linear Threshold Model (LTM), we further present several
useful properties of the noncooperative ICM.
A. Problem formulation
We consider an online social network (OSN) as a directed
graph G(V, E), where V is the set of nodes (OSN users) and
E ⊆ V ×V is the set of edges (social ties) in the network. We
also denote by Nu ⊆ V the set of neighbors of node u. Each
node in the system can either be active or inactive. As more
neighbors of an inactive node become active, it is more likely
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to switch to being active. A node cannot return to the inactive
state once it becomes active. All nodes are inactive at the
beginning of the influence propagation process and marketing
practitioners initially activate K nodes to seed the information
cascade in the social network. The process ends when no more
nodes can be activated. The influence maximization problem is
defined as follows: Determine the K-node seed set to achieve
the maximal expected active nodes at the end of the process.
B. Diffusion models
The Independent Cascade Model (ICM) [11] is a popular
diffusion model for the propagation effect. In ICM, a node i
activated at time t has a probability pi,j to successfully activate
its inactive neighbor j at time t+1. Node i does not have any
further opportunities to activate j again whether it succeeds
or not.
C. Noncooperative influence maximization under ICM
Traditional ICM implicitly assumes that nodes in the sys-
tem will not reserve their influence capacities during the
propagation process. To account for non-cooperativeness the
standard ICM is generalized such that Node j is activated by
Node i with probability αi,j · pi,j , where αi,j ∈ [0, 1] is the
cooperativeness level of Node i on its neighbor Node j. We
assume that node cooperativeness levels are static during the
entire diffusion process.
D. Properties of the noncooperative ICM
We now discuss some nice properties of the noncooperative
ICM. First we define a set function σ(·) to be submodular if
σ(S∪{v})−σ(S) ≥ σ(T ∪{v})−σ(T ) for all v ∈ V \T and
S ⊆ T , i.e., σ(·) satisfies a “diminishing returns” requirement:
the marginal gain from adding a node to a set T is at most
the same as the marginal gain from adding the same node to
a subset of T . In addition, we say that σ(·) is monotone if
σ(T ) ≥ σ(S) for all S ⊆ T , that is, σ(·) will at least stay the
same after adding elements to the original set. We also define
a greedy algorithm as follows: starting from an empty set, the
algorithm iteratively selects a seed which achieves the highest
incremental change of σ(·). [12] proves that a non-negative,
monotone submodular objective function can be approximated
to within a factor of (1−1/e) (around 63%, here e is the base
of the natural logarithm) using the greedy algorithm.
Theorem 1. [12] The greedy algorithm is a (1−1/e) approx-
imation for a non-negative, monotone submodular objective
function.
[1] further proves that the greedy algorithm can also
achieve (1− 1/e) approximation for the influence maximiza-
tion problem by proving that the final influence function σ(·),
which is the expected number of the final active nodes in the
network at the end of the diffusion process, is submodular.
Based on [1], we prove that the influence function under the
proposed noncooperative ICM also satisfies the requirement
of submodularity, so that a greedy algorithm can also achieve
the same (1− 1/e) performance guarantee.
Lemma 1. [1] The influence function σ(·) is submodular for
an arbitrary instance of the ICM.
Theorem 2. The influence function σ(·) of noncooperative
ICM is submodular.
Proof: Since the cooperativeness parameters αi,j are
static, the noncooperative ICM is equivalent to a standard ICM
in which p′i,j = αi,j · pi,j . Thus, according to Lemma 1, the
influence function of noncooperative ICM is also submodular.
Proving that the influence function under noncooperative
ICM also satisfies the requirement of submodularity not only
shows that the model has a performance guarantee, but also
implies that the incentive needed for the advertising campaign
should show similar property, since the amount of incentive
needed is closely related to the seed-node set size. It is also
intuitively satisfying that incentive as a function of seed-
node set size would show a “diminishing returns” property.
The detailed study of the relationship between the amount of
incentive and seed-node set size in noncooperative influence
maximization problem will be our future work.
Note that we have to use Monte-Carlo simulations to esti-
mate σ(·) because there is no explicit formula for the influence
function. This means that we can obtain a (1 − 1/e − )
approximation with small  if we run a large number of
simulations.
IV. THE VCG-LIKE INCENTIVE SCHEME
We introduce an incentive mechanism to solve the node
noncooperation problem in this section. We first introduce a
game-theoretic framework to model node noncooperation in
influence propagation. Next, we describe the incentive method
and derive some nice properties of the mechanism, namely,
individual-rationality (IR) and incentive-compatible (IC). Then
we compare the proposed scheme to a fixed price incentive
mechanism to show some of its other advantages. Finally, we
discuss implementation details of the proposed mechanism.
A. A VCG-like incentive mechanism to solve the noncoopera-
tion problem
We define C(i) as the cost of individual node i during the
influence diffusion process. The utility of an individual node
without payment should be
Ui = −C(i)
= −D ·
∑
j neighbor of i
αi,j · pi,j (1)
In (1) we model C(i) as the sum of the influence probabil-
ities Node i imposes on all its neighbors mainly to reflect the
fact that the more a single node can impact its friends, the more
reward it will ask for from the initiator of the viral marketing
campaign, because “influence” here is considered a scarce
commodity. Also an influential node (e.g., a celebrity) in the
social network may have already expended a large amount of
resources (e.g., time, money, privacy, etc.) in order to cultivate
its impact. D ≥ 0 is the cost-of-influence parameter, which
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converts the amount of influence an individual node exerts
into cost. It is assumed to be constant over the whole network
and known to the operator in our model.
The action of Node i is denoted as αi =
(αi,1, αi,2, . . . , αi,|Ni|), in which 0 ≤ αi,j ≤ 1,
j = 1, 2, . . . , |Ni|. We also assume that all nodes determine
their actions (i.e., cooperativeness levels) at the beginning of
the game simultaneously.
Theorem 3. Without payment, the strategy αˆi which consti-
tutes the Nash equilibrium should be αˆi,j = 0, j neighbor of
i.
Proof: Suppose that Node i chooses an action αi different
from αˆi, with αi = (αi,1, αi,2, . . . , αi,|Ni|), s.t. ∃αi,j = 0.
From the utility function (1) we can see that Node i can
obtain a better payoff by setting αi,j = 0. Thus αi is a strictly
dominated action and cannot be used in any Nash equilibrium.
So the strategy which constitutes the Nash equilibrium should
be in the form αˆi,j = 0, j neighbor of i.
Define VCG-like payment to Node i as
Mi = q · (σ(A)− σ−i(A)) + C(i)
= q · (σ(A)− σ−i(A)) +D ·
∑
j neighbor of i
αi,j · pi,j (2)
where σ(A) − σ−i(A) is the difference of the expected final
active node set size when Node i exists, and the expected size
if Node i does not exist. q ≥ 0 is the amount of reward the
initiator is willing to pay for a successful activation. In other
words, (2) means that besides compensating the individual
cost C(i), the initiator will additionally pay Node i for its
contribution during the influence diffusion stage.
Our proposed VCG-like incentive scheme is different from
the standard scheme in the following two aspects. First, in
traditional mechanism design theory, the goal of VCG auction
is to encourage each selfish agent in the game to disclose
its private information (“types”) to the auctioneer [13]. For
example in [14], under the VCG payment scheme, each node
may choose to report its true forwarding cost so that the least
cost path can be found correctly. But the objective of our
proposed incentive mechanism is to ensure that each selfish
node is cooperative in the sense that they will exert all its
influence capacity (i.e. αi,j = 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , |Ni| for an
arbitrary Node i). Second, in standard VCG, the cost the
operator has to compensate is the reported value claimed by
the selfish node, while in (2) the cost C(i) is the actual
cost Node i has exerted taking its cooperativeness level into
consideration.
Although there are some differences, the proposed VCG-
like payment (2) is similar to the standard VCG payment
formula in structure in that they both consist of two parts:
premium, and some kind of “cost” (reported value or true
value). More importantly, the proposed VCG-like scheme
shares some nice properties of the standard scheme, and such
properties will be discussed next.
First we introduce Lemma 2 which is useful in showing
that the VCG-like incentive scheme will encourage nodes in
the network to be cooperative. In order to prove the lemma,
an equivalent view of the ICM proposed in [1] needs to be
described first.
The probability pi,j in ICM represents the likelihood Node
i will activate Node j when Node i becomes active while at
the same time Node j is inactive. The outcome of this random
event can be viewed as the flipping of a coin of bias pi,j . In
fact we can flip the coin corresponding to each of the edges
at the beginning of the cascading process and the result will
only be revealed when Node i is active while its neighbor
Node j is inactive. This change is equivalent to the original
cascading process. After all the coins have been flipped in
advance, we declare edges in G for which the coin flip result
in heads as live and the remaining edges as blocked. In this
graph, it is clear that a node will be active at the end of the
cascading process if it is on a path consisting of only live edges
from the target set A. Further we can see that the number of
nodes that are active at the end of the cascading process will
be the number of the nodes that are on paths consisting of
only live edges from the target set A. This equivalent view
also shows that the final activated set size under ICM is an
order-independent outcome, that is, if a node has several newly
activated neighbors, the order of their activating attempts will
not affect the final result. For a detailed discussion on the
equivalent view, readers are referred to [1].
Lemma 2. The expression σ(A) − σ−i(A) is always non-
negative, i.e., σ(A)− σ−i(A) ≥ 0.
Proof: Based on the order-independent equivalent view
of the ICM process [1], we can divide the diffusion process
of one sample point X in a sample space S into two steps.
The first step is to simulate the diffusion process in the whole
graph, but assuming all the incoming edges of Node i to be
“blocked” and Node i itself to be inactive. The active set size
at the end of the first step is thus σX,−i(A). In the second
step, we keep the original states of incoming edges (blocked
or live) of i, and activate Node i if it is in the original seed
set A. The result at the end of the second step is thus σX(A).
If Node i is activated first at the beginning of step two (i.e.
i ∈ A), then it is obvious that σX(A) > σX,−i(A). Consider
the case in which i /∈ A, if there is a path from some node in
A to i consisting entirely of live edges, then Node i will be
active and in turn may possibly initiate a cascading process
(i.e. σX(A) > σX,−i(A)), if not, Node i will end up inactive
and the diffusion process ends (i.e. σX(A) = σX,−i(A)). In
general, σX(A) ≥ σX,−i(A). Since
σ(A) =
∑
X∈S
P [X]σX(A) (3)
and
σ−i(A) =
∑
X∈S
P [X]σX,−i(A) (4)
So σ(A)− σ−i(A) ≥ 0.
Lemma 3. [15] Let p′ ∈ [0, 1]|E| be the true influence
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probabilities on each edge. Given a target set A, then
σ(A) =
n∑
i=1
ui(p
′, A) + |A| (5)
where ui(p′, A) is the expected number of neighbors activated
by Node i, given the target set.
Theorem 4. The strategy αˆi which constitutes the Nash
equilibrium should be αˆi,j = 1, j neighbors of i, under the
VCG-like payment scheme.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary Node i, and fix the cooper-
ativeness levels of the other nodes. If Node i is cooperative
(i.e. αi,j = 1, j neighbors of i), with the VCG-like payment,
the utility function of Node i now becomes
Ui = Mi − C(i)
= q · (σ(A)− σ−i(A))
+D ·
∑
j neighbor of i
pi,j −D ·
∑
j neighbor of i
pi,j
= q · (σ(A)− σ−i(A))
(6)
In Lemma 2 we have proved that σ(A)−σ−i(A) ≥ 0. Since
q ≥ 0, so Ui ≥ 0.
Let α′i = (α
′
i,1, α
′
i,2, . . . , α
′
i,|Ni|), s.t. ∃α′i,j < 1 be the
cooperativeness level of a noncooperative Node i, then the
utility becomes
U ′i = M
′
i − C ′(i)
= q · (σ′(A)− σ′−i(A)) +D ·
∑
j neighbor of i
α′i,j · pi,j
−D ·
∑
j neighbor of i
α′i,j · pi,j
= q · (σ′(A)− σ′−i(A))
= q · (σ′(A)− σ−i(A))(Since the cooperativeness levels of
other nodes are fixed)
(7)
Actually the true influence probability vector p′ in
Lemma 3 can be represented as (p′i, p
′
−i), where p
′
i =
(p′i,1, p
′
i,2, . . . , p
′
i,|Ni|) is the true influence probability Node i
has on its neighbors while p′−i is the true influence probability
vector on all other edges in the graph. According to Lemma 3,
the final expected active node set size contains the expected
number of neighbors activated by each node, given target set
A. For each i, Node i can influence more neighbors when it
is cooperative, i.e. ui((pi, p′−i), A) ≥ ui((p′i, p′−i), A). Thus
σ(A) ≥ σ′(A) and Ui ≥ U ′i . The cooperative strategy always
maximizes the node utility.
Theorem 4 implies that the VCG-like incentive scheme sat-
isfies two important properties. The first property is individual-
rationality (IR), that is, for each player, it is always better (i.e.
achieving at least no less utility) to join the game than not
participating. Combining Lemma 2 and Theorem 4 we can
see that the individual utility of Node i is always nonnegative
(0 is the utility when not participating in the game) under the
proposed incentive scheme, so our scheme is IR. The other
property is incentive-compatible (IC) — each player prefers
to act in accordance with the objective of the mechanism.
Theorem 4 has proved that the dominant strategy for a single
node is to be cooperative to exert all its influence capacity
under the VCG-like scheme, which is exactly the design
objective of the proposed scheme, so the scheme is also IC.
IR and IC are also two nice properties of the standard VCG
auction [16].
B. Advantages of the VCG-like scheme over the fixed price
incentive scheme
Another possible, also intuitive incentive scheme is as
follows:
Mi = ε+ C(i)
= ε+D ·
∑
j neighbor of i
αi,j · pi,j (8)
where ε can be any arbitrary positive number. Under this
scheme, besides compensating for the individual cost C(i),
the operator will also pay a fixed amount of incentive ε.
It can be easily shown that under the fixed price incentive
scheme, being cooperative (i.e. αi,j = 1, j = 1, 2, . . . , |Ni|
for an arbitrary Node i) is the weakly dominant strategy for a
selfish node. In other words, the utility of an individual node
is the same (i.e. ε) whether it is cooperative or not. How-
ever, Theorem 4 has already shown that under the VCG-like
scheme, being cooperative is the strongly dominant strategy.
That is to say, the individual utility is maximized if a selfish
node chooses to exert all it influence capacity. From this aspect
the VCG-like scheme is superior to the fixed price scheme.
Another drawback of the fixed price scheme is that every
node can get the same premium ε regardless of its abil-
ity to impact others. That means the fixed price scheme
is not “fair” in the sense that the specific contribution of
an individual node during the influence diffusion process is
ignored. Some “influential” nodes in the social network may
thus find this property discouraging. In contrast, in the VCG-
like scheme (2), σ(A) − σ−i(A), which is the difference of
the final performance when Node i does not exist, exactly
quantifies the contribution of Node i during the diffusion
process. To conclude, being more “fair” is another advantage
of the proposed VCG-like incentive scheme.
C. Some technical discussions on the VCG-like incentive
scheme
1) How do we get the cooperativeness levels of nodes?
Suppose the social network marketer has already determined
the influence probability on each edge in the network through
various methods (e.g. machine learning techniques [17]). Since
the marketer has to pay the real cost (i.e. C(i) in (2)), it is vital
for the proposed incentive scheme to get the cooperativeness
levels (i.e. αi,j) of nodes correctly. In this model we assume
that both nodes on the edge (u, v) have various information
about the properties of the edge. There is a similar assumption
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in [15]. The difference is that in our proposed incentive
scheme, it is obvious that the influencer (i.e. node u in edge
(u, v)) has motivation to lie about its cooperativeness level in
order to get a higher payment. So in the VCG-like incentive
scheme, the influencee (i.e. node v in edge (u, v)) will report
the influence probability p′u,v the influencer node u has exerted
on it to the marketer, thus
αu,v =
p′u,v
pu,v
(9)
2) How do we calculate the premium given to Node i (i.e.
σ(A)− σ−i(A))?
Another possible concern on the VCG-like incentive scheme
is the calculation of σ(A)−σ−i(A) via simulation. Since both
terms of the premium require the expected final active node set
size, the efficiency would be greatly improved if we can reduce
the Monte-Carlo simulation times needed while preserving the
accuracy of the result.
To solve this problem, from the proof of Lemma 2, we see
that the expression σ(A) − σ−i(A) at one sample point X
(i.e. σX(A) − σX,−i(A)) is exactly the marginal increase in
the active set size at the end of the present step compared to
the previous step. So for each simulation run we can store
the value of σX(A) − σX,−i(A) and the average number
over all simulation runs is the result desired. By using this
method we can avoid running two simulations separately and
the efficiency is hence improved.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we study the effect of node noncooperation
on the system performance in terms of the final active set size
under ICM on real large academic collaboration networks.
A. Dataset and influence model
The dataset utilized for evaluation is Arxiv’s co-authorship
network under the General Relativity and Quantum Cosmol-
ogy category [18]. The graph constructed contains 4158 nodes
and 26850 edges. Each node is an author, and an edge between
two authors i and j means that they have co-authored a
paper. We consider the co-authoring relationships between two
authors only once in case they have co-authored more than
one paper. For ICM, we set the activation probability p = 5%
and p = 20%, respectively. We adopt the two-tiered, static
node cooperativeness here. That is, we set αi,j = 1 if Node i
belongs to the seed-node set and αi,j = α < 1, otherwise.
B. Centrality measure utilized under noncooperative ICM
Since seed node selection will have no effect on the
performance of the proposed incentive scheme, the selection
strategy can be the neighborhood-removal heuristic proposed
in [19], the greedy algorithm or the centrality-based (degree or
betweenness) schemes [1]. For ease of simulation we choose
the simple degree-based centrality metric, which measures the
influence of a node in terms of its out degree.
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C. Result
Here we study the effect of node cooperativeness level
on the performance of the degree-based seed node selection
strategy. The results are shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2 under
ICM with activation probability p = 5% and p = 20%,
respectively. The results are obtained as averages of 1000
simulation runs. The x-axis represents the cooperativeness
level α and the y-axis represents the final active set size.
From the figures we can see that the performance of the
seed node selection scheme improves as α increases, and
the performance of algorithms with a larger target set size
is always superior. An intuitive implication for online social
advertising practitioners is that in order to achieve an effective
online viral marketing campaign, enough incentive should be
offered to recruit enough initial product adopters to seed the
influence cascade. In addition, incentives should be offered to
other nodes in the system so that all nodes in the network
would be cooperative to propagate the influence. We have
proved in Theorem 4 that the Nash equilibrium for nodes
under the proposed VCG-like incentive scheme is α = 1, these
simulation results also verify that the system performance
(i.e. active set size) is optimal under the proposed incentive
mechanism.
D. The budget allocation problem
Since the VCG-like incentive scheme requires a budget from
the viral marketer, an interesting question arises: Since one
only has limited budget, should one put all of the budget in
selecting as many seed nodes as possible, or in making sure
that all nodes in the network will be cooperative? There are
some selection criteria suggested by the simulation results.
The final active set size as a function of the initial target
set size under ICM is generally concave as shown in [19]. It
is a natural result due to the submodularity of the influence
function σ(·) (“diminishing return” property). We can also get
the same conclusion from Figure 1 and Figure 2 because the
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differences between the two simulation results under the same
cooperativeness level α are getting smaller as the target set size
increases. This phenomenon is most obvious for ICM when
p = 20%, in which case the performance of the influence
maximization process under target set sizes of 20 and 30 are
almost identical. It means that it may not be cost-effective for
a viral marketer to use the budget entirely on the initial seed
nodes. Figure 1 and Figure 2 also show that the final active
set size as a function of the cooperativeness level α is convex,
which means that the marginal increase in the performance of
the influence maximization process is higher when nodes in
the social network are more cooperative. Therefore, properly
allocating the budget between initial seed node activation and
incentives for non-seed nodes is an important problem, and
we shall study this problem in our further research.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate influence maximization in
noncooperative social networks. We generalize ICM to take
node noncooperation into consideration and provide a provable
approximation guarantees for the noncooperative influence
maximization problem. We also desgin a VCG-like incen-
tive mechanism to solve the node noncooperation problem,
showing it is IR and IC as well as having other nice prop-
erties. The evaluation based on noncooperative ICM shows
the importance of cooperation and incentive in maximizing
influence. In this study, we assume a two-tiered, static node
cooperativeness in the system, i.e., seed nodes are cooperative
to propagate the influence while ordinary nodes are only partly
willing to do so. In the future, we plan to study the impact of
noncooperation in other influence diffusion models, especially
for those not satisfying the submodularity requirement. We
also plan to study the proper allocation of the budget between
initial seed node activation and incentives for non-seed nodes.
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